The Oswald Review: An International Journal of Undergraduate
Research and Criticism in the Discipline of English
Volume 14

Article 5

2012

Vladimir Nabokov’s Singular Nature of Reality: A Close Reading of
Despair and Bend Sinister
Hannah Kim
Emory University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/tor
Part of the Comparative Literature Commons, English Language and Literature Commons, and the
Slavic Languages and Societies Commons

Recommended Citation
Kim, Hannah (2012) "Vladimir Nabokov’s Singular Nature of Reality: A Close Reading of Despair and Bend
Sinister," The Oswald Review: An International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Criticism in the
Discipline of English: Vol. 14 , Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/tor/vol14/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you by the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholar Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in The Oswald Review: An International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Criticism in
the Discipline of English by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Vladimir Nabokov’s Singular Nature of Reality: A Close Reading of Despair and
Bend Sinister
Keywords
Vladimir Nabokov, Despair, Bend Sinister, Consciousness, Symbolism, unreliable narrator

This article is available in The Oswald Review: An International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Criticism in
the Discipline of English: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/tor/vol14/iss1/5

58

Vladimir Nabokov’s Singular Nature of Reality:
A Close Reading of Despair and Bend Sinister

Hannah Kim
Emory University

I

n Despair and Bend Sinister, Vladimir Nabokov utilizes
various literary and narrative devices to study consciousness.
Symbolism, unreliable narrators, and artifice present a
literary reality that invites the readers to observe how each
character’s consciousness builds the world it perceives. We
are also exposed to different consciousness’ imperfections
through which we are encouraged to reflect on our own
mental and psychological inclinations. In the end, Nabokov
points to the entirely individualistic and subjective nature
of truth and suggests that we might never objectively know

59

Truth or Reality because everything we know and perceive
is filtered through a biased mind. Instead, he stresses the
importance of being aware of the necessarily unique way
everyone perceives the world.
In Despair, mirrors symbolize the distorted way
consciousness often perceives and interprets the world.
“For Nabokov,” Ellen Pifer comments, “the world is not an
objective entity but a universe embraced by consciousness”
(127). In other words, reality does not exist apart from
the mind that encounters it, and Nabokov compares
consciousness to a mirror because the world we perceive is
reflective of our inner world just as a mirror merely reflects
what is before it. A distorted consciousness, like a colored
mirror, produces a misrepresented version of reality that
is colored by certain beliefs, emotions, and prejudices.
Mirrors also don’t change shape unless shattered; comparing
our mind to a mirror thus attests to our consciousness’
stubbornness as well.
Within the novel, Hermann’s consciousness is colored
by his unwavering belief that he has found his doppelgänger,
and this causes Hermann to see the world entirely differently
from everyone else. It is interesting to note that he dislikes
mirrors. “Now that is a word I loathe, that ghastly thing!”
exclaims Hermann, and he even writes that “the merely
mention of it has just given [him] a nasty shock” (Despair
27). Instead of seeing himself and the world as it really is,
he relies on his own mind which repeatedly produces false
doubles. Colored by his belief in a doppelgänger, Hermann
imagines Felix to be his mirror image when really it is only
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his consciousness reflecting distorted images: “for some ten
seconds we kept looking into each other’s eyes. Slowly I
raised my right arm, but his left did not rise, as I had almost
expected to do. I closed my left eye, but both his eyes
remained open” (Despair 20). When he does encounter a
true mirror, Hermann convinces himself that the reflection
he sees is not himself, but Felix: “when at last I got back to
my hotel room, I found there, amid mercurial shadows and
framed in frizzly bronze, Felix awaiting me. Pale-faced and
solemn he drew near. He was now well-shaven” (Despair
22).
Hermann’s repeated denial of Felix’s uniqueness
dramatizes the subjective nature of reality in Despair. We see
that Hermann had been aware of their physical differences
from the beginning:
I possess large yellowish teeth; his are whiter and set
more closely together, but is that really important?
On my forehead a vein stands out like a capital M
imperfectly drawn, but when I sleep my brow is as
smooth as that of my double. And those ears… the
convolutions of his are but very slightly altered in
comparison with mine: here more compressed, there
smoothed out. We have eyes of the same shape,
narrowly slit with sparse lashes, but his iris is paler
than mine. (Despair 24)
Though he himself observes certain facial differences,
Hermann insists that they are the same person. Again and
again he considers the possibility that Felix might not
be his double—“who knows, maybe he was not the least
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like me after all” — but Hermann always returns to his
original disposition (Despair 88). His ability to perceive
Felix as his double while contrary evidence abound shows
that “every item perceived by Nabokov’s narrators and
protagonists similarly acts as a mirror of the observation of
consciousness” (Pifer 127). In other words, what Hermann
sees and fails to see are not indicative of what his sensory
abilities are capable of, but what his consciousness is
desirous of. This is why Hermann’s use of the phrase “to
my eyes” is so important because it was his desire to see a
doppelgänger that his eyes responded to (Despair 21).
Hermann believing Felix to be his identical twin is
not an isolated, one-time mistake because we see that his
consciousness idealizes doubles and produces them over
and over again. When travelling through a foreign town
to meet Felix again, Hermann comes across what he takes
to be one of Ardalion’s pictures and asks the store owner
how she came to attain it. When she replies that her niece
painted it, Hermann thinks “[W]ell, I’m damned! For had
I not seen something very similar, if not identical, among
Ardalion’s pictures?” (Despair 65) However, Hermann later
discovers that the painting’s subjects are “not quite two
roses and not quite a pipe, but a couple of large peaches
and a glass ashtray” (Despair 93). Similarly, Hermann is
prone to thinking that every face looks, more or less, the
same. When Ardalion asserts that “every face is unique,”
Hermann retorts “Well, now, really—unique! … Isn’t that
going too far? Take for instance the definite types of human
faces that exist in the world; say, zoological types. There are
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people with the features of apes; there is also the rat type,
the swine type. Then take the resemblance to celebrities…”
(Despair 43). Instead of perceiving individual differences
in people, Hermann is busy categorizing. When he shares
that he “longed passionately for [Ardalion] to start talking
about doubles,” we observe that mirror image is a deeprooted obsession with Hermann—a tint to his mirror of
consciousness (Despair 43).
In addition to mirror symbolisms, Nabokov also employs
an unreliable narrator to further suggest that consciousness
is often misleading. In the introduction of Despair, Nabokov
calls Hermann, our lying and exaggerating narrator, a
“neurotic scoundrel” (Despair 11). From the very first
sentence of the novel we can see Hermann’s inconsistent
personality: “If I were not perfectly sure of my power to
write and of my marvelous ability to express ideas with the
utmost grace and vividness… So, more or less, I had thought
of beginning of my tale” (Despair 13). The sentence lacks
the “utmost grace” and logic that Hermann professes to
possess, and the awkward phrases such as “well, as I was
saying” and “I think I ought to inform the reader” insinuate
that Hermann is not, in fact, perfectly sure of his literary
talent (Despair 14). We also see that Hermann has no qualms
about lying when he confesses, “[T]hat bit about my mother
was a deliberate lie […] I could, of course have crossed it
out, but I purposely leave it there as a sample of one of my
essential traits: my light-hearted, inspired lying” (Despair
14). Lastly, Hermann seems to acknowledge that his writing
is imperfect and unreliable because he is writing from
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memory:
The pines sought gently, snow lay about, with bald
patches of soil showing black. What nonsense! How
could there by snow in June? Ought to be crossed
out, were it not wicked to erase; for the real author
is not I, but my impatient
memory. Understand
it just as you please; it is none of my business.
(Despair 41)
It is particularly insightful for Hermann to have noticed
that it is not his being itself narrating but his flawed and
biased memory retracing the story. Indeed, it is our unique
consciousness that stumbles upon the world to make sense
of whatever it encounters. Furthermore, since all minds have
different inclinations, bias and errors are to be expected.
Lastly, Nabokov uses humorous cases of extreme
situational irony to convey how the folly of our
consciousness can be comical at times. To the end Hermann
refuses to believe that his “art,” or the foolish murder of
Felix, has failed because he and Felix bear no resemblance.
Instead, he complains,“[A]ll that disgusting mess is due
to the inertia, pigheadedness, prejudice of humans, failing
to recognize me in the corpse of my flawless double”
(Despair 162). Of course, this is extremely ironic because
it was precisely this stubborn bias of his mind that led him
to his demise. Similarly, when first encountering Felix,
Hermann comments that it would only be “the partiality
and fallaciousness of human eyesight” that would lead
others to miss their resemblance (Despair 19). Through
these comically ironic situations, Nabokov comments on the

64

inherent difficulty consciousness faces in becoming aware of
its own limitations.
If mirrors in Despair express consciousness’ tendency
to project whatever is already within itself, liquids in Bend
Sinister reflect consciousness’ fluid nature. The motif of
liquid blots reoccurs throughout the novel. The very first
scene in the book contains an oblong puddle, and the
subsequent chapter takes place over a bridge where Krug
feels “an intimate connection with the black lacquered
water lapping and heaving under the stone arches of the
bridge” (Bend Sinister 14). Here, the black “heaving” water
seems to reflect Krug’s own self, a gloomy man who had
been crying and struggling. The liquid imagery returns
again when Dr. Alexander’s pen bleeds ink and Krug sees
the ink blot, “a fancy footprint or the spatulate outline of a
puddle” (Bend Sinister 50). Lastly, Skotoma, the founder of
Ekwilism, makes explicit the comparison between human
consciousness, liquid, and container:
Human beings, he said, were so many vessels
containing unequal portions of this essentially
uniform consciousness. It was, however, quite
possible, he maintained, to regulate the capacity
of the human vessels […] either by grading the
contents or by eliminating the fancy vessels and
adopting a standard size. (Bend Sinister 68)
Because he believed consciousness to be fluid and
malleable, Skotoma strove to regulate the shape of
consciousness by limiting the “vessels”—people’s beliefs,
emotions, and expressions.
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In Krug’s case, everything he experiences is molded
according to his prevailing grief, just as everything Hermann
sees is colored by his belief in a doppelgänger. Krug asserts
in the beginning that “the operation has not been successful
and [that his] wife will die” (Bend Sinister 6). The despair
resulting from this tragic occasion proceeds to affect
everything Krug observes. For instance, illusions of Olga
flash across Krug’s mind while he is crossing the bridge:
“Suddenly, with the vividness of a praedormital image or
of a bright-robed lady on stained glass, she drifted across
his retina, in profile, carrying something[…] and the wall
dissolved, the torrent was loosed again” (Bend Sinister 13).
The ink blot Krug observes from Dr. Alexander’s pen takes
the shape of a puddle, the first thing Krug observed when
looking outside the hospital window after Olga’s death.
Similarly, when Paduk spills milk by knocking down the
tumbler, “what was left of the milk made a kidney-shaped
white puddle on the desk” (Bend Sinister 132). Kidney
failure, of course, was the cause of Olga’s death, and the
puddle image returns again and again. “The world Krug
perceives,” Pifer explains, “is a psychic landscape, centered
about his own preoccupations and concerns […] Everything
Krug perceives is transmuted and infused by the grief, the
love, the loss he experiences at Olga’s death” (81). Thus
in Bend Sinister, the ever-conforming liquid motif reveals
the workings of Krug’s consciousness— his affected mind
whose perception of the world is conditioned by his despair.
Furthermore, by suggesting that it was Krug’s
mental state that brought about his own demise, Nabokov
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points to the danger of not being aware of the way one’s
consciousness interprets the world. As an academic, Krug
is always trying to reason the world out, and he fails to
understand the brutality of the Ekwilist regime simply
because he does not perceive its legitimacy. “My dear
friend, you know well my esteem for you,” President
Azureus pleads, “but you are a dreamer, a thinker. You do
not realize the circumstances” (Bend Sinister 47). Instead
of considering the dangers of Paduk’s regime, Krug holds
onto his stubborn belief that he is somehow untouchable.
His obliviousness is a partial result of his childhood
memory of bullying Paduk. Krug recalls that “toad was
[Paduk’s] nickname,” confessing that he was “something
of a bully” who used to “trip [Paduk] up and sit upon his
face” (Bend Sinister 46). Krug’s heavy reliance on the past
manifests itself through his unwillingness to pay the proper
respect to Paduk during his interview. Alarmed by Krug’s
condescending manner, the surrounding guards warn that
“this is still not the right manner” and that he “should bear in
mind that notwithstanding the narrow and fragile bridge of
school memories uniting the two sides, these are separated
in depth by an abyss of power and dignity which even a
great philosopher cannot hope to measure” (Bend Sinister
129). Though he is ordered not to “indulge in this atrocious
familiarity,” Krug continues to anger Paduk and the guards
(Bend Sinister 129).
Krug’s pride, philosophic tendencies, and apathy make
it difficult for Krug to protect himself and David from
Paduk’s totalitarian government. Indeed, Krug is unable
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to foresee David’s impending danger despite the obvious
hints. Entrenched in his own perception of reality, Krug
entirely disregards others’ reality—Paduk’s and President
Azerues’, among others— and brings about his own
tragic end. Laurie Clancy aptly observes that “although
[Nabokov’s] sympathies are patently with Krug, the author
is nevertheless careful to point out the flaws in Krug’s
greatness—his arrogance and foolish conviction of his own
safety and failure to see how his presence endangers his
friends” (96). For instance, though Krug has had the chance
to escape the country, he delays for no apparent reason. By
blinding Krug to the well-apparent fact that Mariette is a spy,
Nabokov exposes how illogical our minds can be when we
are insistent upon our own reality. The able reader is quick to
pick up on Marietta’s suspicious motives given that she had
worked for a well-known artist until he suddenly was sent to
a prison camp, not to mention that she randomly shows up at
Krug’s door. Even Krug’s intuition seems to respond to these
hints when he comments that “there was something rather
irritating about her,” but he fails to act upon it (Bend Sinister
123). Thus Nabokov suggests that it is not enough merely to
know that our consciousness is biased; one should at least
have a faint idea of one’s own inclinations if one wishes to
avoid Hermann and Krug’s fate.
Nabokov also dramatizes the unreliable and artificial
nature of reality in Bend Sinister by robbing his characters
of autonomy; the use of artifice reminds the reader that there
is no objective reality. The narrator repeatedly makes his
presence felt by calling Krug his “favorite character” and
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by employing changes in narrative voices (135). The reality
in Bend Sinister is full of shifting perspectives. Whereas
the first chapter begins with Krug’s first-person narrative,
the second chapter switches to an omniscient third person
narrator that observes Krug. The change in gaze, voice, and
awareness between “my wife will die” and “Krug halted
in the doorway” conveys that there are always at least two
different angles to any given reality (Bend Sinister 7). The
shifting identity of narrative voices makes it difficult for
the reader to clearly distinguish between what is real and
what is imagined in the novel (Clancy 95). The narrator
also provides the reader with multiple versions of the story;
after describing Krug’s meeting with Paduk, the narrator
interrupts, “[N]o, it did not go on quite like that. In the
first place Paduk was silent during most of the interview”
(Bend Sinister 131). Nabokov even addresses Krug directly
towards the end of the novel when he writes: “the echoing
steps retreated. Silence. Now, at last, you may think” (202).
By repeatedly disrupting the seemingly real world of Bend
Sinister, Nabokov suggests that the world we live in, like
Krug’s world, is entirely dependent on human consciousness.
The biggest authorial intervention occurs at the end of
the novel when Krug finds that he is a mere character at the
whim of the narrator, and it is important for us to note that
our position is not too different from Krug’s; we, too, are
at the whims of the universe and our own consciousness
and will therefore never truly and objectively understand
reality. Towards the end of Bend Sinister, the narrator shares
that he “felt a pang of pity for Adam and slid towards him
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along an inclined beam of pale light—causing instantaneous
madness” (203). This madness opens Krug’s eyes to the
“simple reality” that “he and his son and wife and everybody
else are merely [Nabokov]’s whims,” that everything is “only
absurd mirages, illusions oppressive to Krug during his brief
spell of being” (Bend Sinister vii). Aware of the true nature
of his existence, Krug cries, “[Y]ou silly people […] what on
earth are you afraid of? What does it all matter? Ridiculous!
Same as those infantile pleasures—Olga and the boy taking
part in some silly theatricals, she getting drowned, he losing
his life or something in a railway accident. What on earth
does it matter?” (Bend Sinister 206) The narrator even saves
Krug from dying by suddenly putting an end to the novel,
an artifice Nabokov describes as “slippery sophism, a play
upon words” (210). However, Nabokov does not employ
these extreme interventions solely to exercise his omnipotent
power as the creator or even to take the easy way out.
Instead, by using artifice to create a dream-like world where
illusion and reality overlap, Nabokov invites the reader to
compare his reality to that of Krug’s:
The origins of our existence are ultimately
mysterious, remaining beyond the reach of the words
we summon to define and describe. Hedged by the
unknown surrounding us, we struggle, like Adam
Krug, to peer beyond the limits of our condition,
seeking to populate the terrifyingly empty spaces
with our words and images. (Pifer 95)
By witnessing Krug’s lack of autonomy, we become
aware of the possibility that our reality, too, is never
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concrete, independent, and objective.
In the end, symbolism, unreliable narrators, and
artifice in Despair and Bend Sinister show that life is a
series of biased impressions and that every consciousness
is necessarily singular. Each consciousness builds the
individual’s world, and this is why the unique nature of
consciousness is crucial; there is no such thing as average
reality because our subjective minds render it impossible
for us to grasp the objective truth—if there is any at all.
Both novels uphold the supremacy of the individual
consciousness, no matter how imperfect it may be. Lastly,
because each individual consciousness is unique, to ignore
or suppress someone’s consciousness is to wipe out his or
her world and existence. Nabokov seems to speak directly
through Ardalion in Despair: “in the whole world there
are not, and cannot be, two men alike, however well you
disguise them” (Despair 170). Nabokov defends every
consciousness’ singularity, and it is only the deranged or the
evil—such as Hermann and Paduk— who believe in true
doubles.
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